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Abstract 
Recently, it has been emphasized that the 
possibility theory framework allows us to dis­
tinguish between i) what is possible because 
it is not ruled out by the available knowledge, 
and ii) what is possible for sure. This distinc­
tion may be useful when representing knowl­
edge, for modelling values which are not im­
possible because they are consistent with the 
available knowledge on the one hand, and 
values guaranteed to be possible because re­
ported from observations on the other hand. 
It is also of interest when expressing prefer­
ences, to point out values which are positively 
desired among those which are not rejected. 
This distinction can be encoded by two types 
of constraints expressed in terms of necessity 
measures and in terms of guaranteed possibil­
ity functions, which induce a pair of possibil­
ity distributions at the semantic level. A con­
sistency condition should ensure that what is 
claimed to be guaranteed as possible is indeed 
not impossible. The present paper investi­
gates the representation of this bipolar view . , mcluding the case when it is stated by means 
of conditional measures, or by means of com­
parative context-dependent constraints. The 
interest of this bipolar framework, which has 
been recently stressed for expressing prefer­
ences, is also pointed out in the representa­
tion of diagnostic knowledge. 
1 Introduction 
The idea of equipping a set of possible worlds, such as 
the interpretations of a classical logic language, with 
a complete pre-order is simple and useful for encod­
ing preferences or plausibility orderings. This idea 
has emerged in the late eighties for providing non-
monotonic consequence relations of the type "from p, 
q normally follows" requiring that all the most pre­
ferred/plausible/normal models of p be models of q 
[15]. Interestingly enough, possibility theory [17, 8] 
has been developed in the meantime, as a framework 
for modelling states of partial ignorance on the basis of 
possibility distributions encoding complete pre-orders. 
Then, possibility measures of events, defined as the 
maximum of the distribution over the set of models 
of the considered events, together with the dual mea­
sures of necessity, are used for assessing uncertainty. 
As such, possibility theory relies on a minimal speci­
ficity principle which states that the possibility level 
associated to a possible world should be the largest 
one which is compatible with the constraints represent­
ing the available information. It agrees in particular 
with the classical view of logical modelling according 
to which each of piece of information declares some 
worlds impossible (the others forming a subset of ten­
tatively possible ones). When pieces of information are 
conjunctively combined, the resulting set of the possi­
ble worlds is indeed the largest set compatible with all 
pieces of information. Possibility theory extends this 
view by allowing intermediary levels between what is 
fully possible and what is completely impossible. 
More recently, the idea that there exist situations 
where the information could be bipolar has been advo­
cated in [16], and in [5] for the possibility theory frame­
work. It corresponds to situations where two complete 
preorders, rather than one, are necessary to represent 
the whole information conveniently. While a consis­
tency condition should be maintained between them 
they behave in opposite ways in order to be comple� 
mentary. Namely, while one of the two distributions 
agrees with the classical logical view mentioned above 
the other rather corresponds to an idea of close world 
assumption, where only the information explicitly re­
ported is held for true. The latter view obeys to a max­
imal specificity principle where only the worlds which 
are known as existing are considered to be possible. 
The information is then accumulated disjunctively in 
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the sense that the larger the number of reported cases, 
the larger the range of worlds which are guaranteed to 
be possible. 
This bipolar framework can be of interest for modelling 
knowledge in order to distinguish between what is pos­
sible because it is just consistent with what is known, 
and what is possible for sure since it has been ob­
served. For instance, the information about the prices 
of houses in some area is usually partly made of gen­
eral rules constraining the possible prices and of ex­
amples of reported cases. The bipolar view is also 
natural when modelling preferences if we have to dis­
tinguish between positive desires and preferences re­
flecting what it is not rejected as unsatisfactory [3]. 
Another situation which can lead to a bipolar repre­
sentation is the case where we start with a possibility 
distribution over a power set of possible worlds that 
we want to approximate from above and from below 
by distributions on the referential set, as explained in 
Section 7. 
The paper aims at showing how the possibility the­
ory framework is convenient for handling bipolar rep­
resentations. The next section explains how a pair of 
consistent distributions, referred to as lower and upper 
distributions respectively, should be associated with a 
treatment respectively in terms of guaranteed possi­
bility functions (also called .6.-functions) and maximal 
specificity principle, and in terms of (classical) pos­
sibility measure II and minimal specificity principle. 
A joint treatment of .6, and II functions is provided, 
applying maximal specificity principle on .6., and min­
imal specificity principle on II. It is shown that the 
two principles are the two sides of a unique principle 
of minimal commitment. Section 3 summarizes logical 
representation results in terms of .6.-functions-based 
constraints and of necessity-based constraints. Sec­
tions 4, 5 and 6 show how the idea of conditioning, in 
terms of context-dependent comparative constraints, 
or in terms of conditional functions, can be applied to 
the bipolar representation framework. Section 7 pro­
vides an illustration of the usefulness of the proposed 
representation framework in diagnosis modelling. 
2 Bipolar possibility theory 
2.1 Constraints on a possibility distribution 
The basic representational tool in possibility theory is 
the notion of a possibility distribution [17], denoted by 
n:, which encodes a complete preorder on a referential 
set U of possible worlds or possible interpretations. A 
degree n:(u) E [0, 1] evaluates to what extent u E U can 
be the actual state of the world. So the larger n:(u), 
the greater the plausibility of u, the more normal u 
is, the more preferred u is, the more satisfactory u is, 
according to the problem under concern (knowledge or 
preference modelling). 
A possibility distribution, representing the available 
information, should obey a principle of minimal speci­
ficity. This principle states that each possible inter­
pretation u should receive the largest possibility de­
gree in agreement with the set of constraints induced 
by the available information. If the available informa­
tion states that "the actual state of the world is in 
a (classical) subset A", this means that any possibil­
ity distribution 1r such that Vu, n:(u) ::; A(u) (we use 
the same notation for a subset and its characteristic 
function) is in accordance with the information. The 
information 1r :S A only rules out the values outside 
A which are asserted as completely impossible (since 
A(u) = 0 iff u tf_ A). Choosing a particular n: such that 
1r < A, for representing the information, would be ar­
bitrarily too precise. Hence choosing the largest pos­
sibility distribution n:* such that n: ::; A, i.e. n:* = A, 
is natural. Clearly, a collection of constraints 1r ::; A; 
for i = 1, · · · , n should be aggregated conjunctively, 
i.e.,n: :S min;A;. The more constraints of this form, 
the more precise our information about the location 
of the actual state of the world. It corresponds to 
the situation in classical logic, where the more formu­
las, the smaller the set of interpretations which make 
them true. The full consistency of the constraints is 
achieved when n:* is normalized, i.e. 3u, n:*(u) = 1, 
which means that there remains at least one fully pos­
sible interpretation. 
This approach extends to the case where the A; 's or 
A are fuzzy subsets. Let A-a= {u: A(u) > a}. Note 
that the A-a's are nested, i.e. a 2': j3 =} Aa- � A13. 
Then 1r :S A means that Va, Vu tf_ Aa-, n:(u) :S a, 
i.e. the possibility of u is upper-bounded by a. This 
can be translated in terms of the set of constraints 
'<Ia, II((Aa-)c) ::; a, where Ac is the complement of A 
in U and where II is a possibility measure defined from 
7r by 
II(A) = SUPuEAn:(u), VA� U. 
It can be as well stated in terms of the dual necessity 
measure N(A) = 1- II(N), i.e. 
'<Ia, N(Aa-) 2': 1- a, (1) 
which expresses that we are certain, at least at level 
1 - a, that the actual world is in A a-. 
But there exists a converse type of constraint of the 
form 1r 2': A, which expresses that all the values in A 
are possible at least at the degree to which these val­
ues belong to A. It corresponds to a different kind of 
information of the type "all the values in A are pos­
sible" . Such a piece of information is natural when 
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reporting on observed data whose feasibility, or possi­
bility of appearance is thus guaranteed. The aggrega­
tion of such pieces of information is disjunctive since 
1r 2': Aj for j = 1, · · · , m entails 1r 2': maxi Aj and 
corresponds to a data accumulation process. The no­
tion of possibility underlying the constraint 1r 2': A is 
related to a set function, denoted t.., different from 
the possibility measure II. Indeed 1r 2': A means that 
Va,Vu E Aa,Tr(u) 2': a, i.e. 
Va, t.(Aa) 2': a, (2) 
where Aa = {u: A(u) 2': a} and t..(A) = infueA7r(u) 
is the minimum degree of possibility over A and is 
called the "guaranteed possibility" of A. 
Clearly with constraints of the form 1r 2': A, we cannot 
apply a principle of minimal specificity (which would 
lead to the state of complete ignorance, Vu, 1r(u) = 1). 
We should rather use the converse principle of maxi­
mal specificity which allocates to each value its mini­
mum degree of possibility enforced by the constraint. 
It corresponds to the idea of focusing only on what 
has been actually observed. So the information 1r 2': A 
translates into 1r. = A applying this principle. In par­
ticular 1r,(u) = 0 if u ¢ {u : A(u) > 0}, since then 
there is no reason to assume that u is (somewhat) pos­
sible, as far as it has not been reported. 
Note that II is a maxitive set function (increasing in 
the wide sense with set inclusion), i.e. II(A U B) = 
max(II(A),II(B)), VA, VB, while guaranteed possibil­
ity functions are decreasing set functions such that 
t.(A U B) = min(t.(A), t.(B)). This means that in­
terpretations covered by A or B are guaranteed to be 
possible (i.e., because they are observed, feasible, sat­
isfactory, permitted, according to the problems) if and 
only if both the interpretations in A and those in B 
are guaranteed to be possible. 
2.2 The bipolar view 
Generally, the two types of information described 
above may be available, namely the ones of the form 
1r ::; A1 and those of the form 1r 2': A2, leading to the 
obvious consistency requirement 1r, = A2 ::; IT* = A1, 
I.e., 
Vu, 1r,(u)::; 1r'(u). (3) 
This agrees with the idea that what is observed is only 
a part of what is possible. 
Thus a pair of consistent lower and upper possibility 
distributions IT, and IT', obeying to (3) can be seen as 
encoding two types of information of the form respec­
tively t.(A*") 2': a where IT, = A,, i.e. the worlds 
in A,a are guaranteed to be possible at degree a on 
the one hand, and of the form N(Ai;-) 2': 1 - a where 
1r' = A*, i.e. it is certain at degree 1 - a that the 
actual world is in Ai;-. 
Given a consistent pair of possibility distributions 1r, 
and 7r* ( 1r. ::; IT' ) , the uncertainty of an event A 
is evaluated by the ordered pair (t..(A),II(A)), with 
t.(A) ::; II(A), since t. is defined from 1r, and II from 
1r*. This can be symbolically written (t.., II)( A) = 
(t..(A),II(A)). Then we have 
(t.., II)( A U  B)= mM((t.., II)( A), (t.., II)( B)), (4) 
where m stands for min and M for max, and 
mM((a, b), (c, d)) = (min( a, c) , max(b, d)). Introduc­
ing by duality 
(N, 'V)(A) = (N(A), 'V(A)) = 1- (t.., II)(Ac ) (5) 
= 1- (t..(N), II(N)) 
= (1 - II(N), 1- t..(N)), 
where 1- (a, b)= (1- b, 1 - a), we have similarly 
(N, 'V)(A n B)= mM((N, 'V)(A), (N, 'V)(B)). 
'V(A) is called the potential necessity of A. Indeed, 
we have N(A) ::; 'V(A). Providing that IT' is normal­
ized and that 3u, 1r,(u) = 0 (which is always possible 
by adding an extra element), the following inequality 
holds 
max(N(A), t.(A)) :S: min(II(A), 'V(A)). (6) 
Up to (6), the four set functions N, t., II and 'V are un­
related. This strongly contrasts with the probabilistic 
setting where only one quantity assesses the uncer­
tainty of A, since Prob(N) = 1- Prob(A). 
In general, while (4) holds for the disjunction, we only 
have the inequality 
II( An B)::; min(II(A), II( B)), 
for possibility measures, since AnB may be impossible 
while An Be and thus A can be fully possible, as well 
as AcnE and thus B. A counterpart of this inequality 
holds for t., namely 
t.(A n B) 2: max(t.(A), t.(B)), 
since the minimum of 1r, over An B may be greater 
than the minima over A, and over B. These two in­
equalities can be written more compactly as 
(t.., II)( An B)<:;; Mm((t.., II)( A), (t.., II)(B)), (7) 
where Mm((a, b), (c, d)) = (max(a, c), min(b, d)) and 
where (a, b) <:;; (c, d) means a 2: c and b ::; d. The 
partial order "<:;;" could be understood here as mean­
ing "better informed than". Note that the princi­
ples of minimal and maximal specificity jointly ap­
plied to upper and lower constraints IT* ::; A1 and 
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rr. 2: A2, i.e. (rr.,rr* ) � (A2,A1), leading to take 
(rr.,rr• ) = (A2,AJ), amounts to a unique principle 
of minimal commitment regarding the available infor­
mation: do not represent more information than you 
have. The principle of minimal commitment applied 
to (7) leads to the equality 
(A, II)( An B)= Mm((A, II)( A), (A, II)( B)). (8) 
When (8) holds, A(A n B) (resp. II(A n B)) does not 
bring further information w.r.t. A(A) and A(B) (resp. 
II(A) and II(B)). 
Observe that (8) encompasses the condition II(A n 
B) = min(II(A), II( B)), which is a form of indepen­
dence between A and B, called by Nahmias [13], "un­
relatedness". The corresponding form of independence 
for A reads, A(A n B) = max(A(A), A( B)), i.e. if 
A and B are unrelated, the interpretations in A and 
B are guaranteed to be possible as far as the inter­
pretations of A, or those of B, are guaranteed to be 
possible. 
Besides, apart from '� ', there exists another natu­
ral partial ordering which can be introduced in the 
bipolar framework, that we shall denote by �' which 
means "less possible than", and which is defined by 
(A, II)( A) � (A, II)( B) iff A(A) � A(B) and II(A) � 
II( B). These two orderings induce a bilattice structure 
in the sense of Ginsberg [11]. 
3 Bipolar possibilistic logic 
Lower and upper possibility distributions are not al­
ways directly available, but are rather implicitly spec­
ified by means of guaranteed possibility-based con­
straints and necessity-based constraints respectively. 
These constraints bear on sets of possible worlds which 
are no longer necessarily nested, as in the case of the 
a-level cuts of the fuzzy sets specifying the distribu­
tions in Section 2 .1. 
In possibilistic logic [6], the information is priori­
tized in terms of necessity measures. A possibilistic 
logic base is a set of weighted formulas of the form 
E = {(a;,")';l : i = 1,···,n}, where a; is a proposi­
tional formu a (which corresponds to a set of models 
A;) and /i belongs to a totally ordered scale such as 
[0, 1]. (a;, li) means that the necessity degree of A; is 
at least equal to "")';, i.e. N (A;) 2: /i. 
With a possibilistic logic base E, a unique possibil­
ity distribution, denoted by rrr;, is associated at the 
semantical level; it is defined by [6]: 1:/u E U, 
• ( 
) 
{
 1 
if V( a;, -y;) E E, u I= a; 7l"I: u = 1 - max{"Y; : (a;, -y;) E E and u � a; } otherwise, 
where rr; is in agreement with the minimal specificity 
principle. Indeed this is the largest possibility distri­
bution whose the associated necessity measure N sat­
isfies N (A;) 2: "")'; for all i such that (a;, 1;) E E. 
Besides, the inference rule (a V b, a), (�a V c, {3) f-
(b V c, min( a, {3)) is the basis of the possibilistic in­
ference machinery at the syntactic level [6]. 
In possibilistic logic each formula (a;, /i) expresses 
that it is certain at level /i that the actual state of 
the world is among the models of a;, i.e. that the 
counter-models of a; are only possible at most at level 
1 - "")';. Then a possibilistic logic base E = { (a;,"")';) : 
i = 1, · · ·, n} is associated with the upper possibility 
distribution rr; defined above. 
Another type of information is encoded by constraints 
of the form A(Bj) 2: Jj for asserting that any model 
of a proposition bj, whose set of models is Bj, is a 
possible candidate for being the actual world at least 
at level Jj. Such a set of constraints defines what 
can be called a lower possibilistic base, of the form 
3 = {[bj, Jj]: j = 1, · · · , m}, where [bj, Jj] encodes the 
inequality A(Bj) 2: Jj. Applying the maximal speci­
ficity principle, leads to derive the following lower dis­
tribution with 3, defined by 
Definition 1 
rr.:=: is the smallest distribution whose associated A­
function satisfies 1:/j, A(Bj) 2: Jj. 
Besides, the logical machinery for A-weighted formulas 
is governed by the following cut rule [a 1\ b, a], [�a 1\ 
c,/3] f- [b/\c,min(a,/3)] [5], which is the counterpart 
of the possibilistic resolution rule, exchanging A and 
N, 1\ and V. 
4 Bipolar conditioning 
A conditional possibility measure II(. I A) has been 
defined by Risdal [12] as satisfying the Bayes-like re­
lationship: 
II( An B)= min(II(B I A), II(A)). (9) 
The principle of minimal specificity leads to define 
II(. I A) as the greatest solution of this equation, 
namely, if A=/= 0: 
{ 
1 if II(A n B) = II(A) II(B I A)= II(A n B) if II( An Be)> II(A n B). 
II(B I A) II(B) implies II(A n B) 
min(II(A), II( B)), i.e. A and B are unrelated in the 
sense of Section 2 (not conversely). The dual con­
ditional necessity measure is simply N(B I A) 
1- II(Bc I A). 
This is an ordinal form of conditioning, adapted to 
finite settings, with a qualitative (ordinal) possibility 
-; 
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scale. The corresponding conditional possibility dis­
tribution 11'(. I A) is defined by: { 1 ifu E A and 11'(u) = II(A) 
11'(u I A)= 11'(u) u E A and 11'(u) < II(A) 
0 u rf, A. 
Conditioning can be also defined for guaranteed pos­
sibility measures. As for the inference, it works in a 
reversed way w.r.t. II. Namely, conditioning obeys the 
following equation 
�(An B)= max(�(B I A), �(A)), (10) 
It means that An B is guaranteed possible either be­
cause A is so or because, in the context A, B is guar­
anteed possible. 
Since �(A) = min(�(A n B), �(An Be)), it expresses 
either that the minimum of 71'• over A is reached on 
An B and that �(B I A) can be taken as equal to 0 
by virtue of the principle of maximal specificity, or that 
�(A) = �(An Be) < �(An B) and then �(B I A) 
should be equal to �(An B). Thus, we have 
{ �(An B) if �(A) < �(An B) �(B I A)= 0 if �(An Be);:::: �(An B)= �(A). 
It can be checked that if �(B I A) = 0 then A and B 
are unrelated, i.e. �(An B)= max(�(A), �(B)). 
Interestingly enough, we can define upper and lower 
possibilistic conditioning in a compact way as obeying 
the relation 
(�,II)( An B)= Mm((�, II)(B I A),(�, II)(A)). 
(11) 
Moreover it can be shown that 
N(B I A) > 0 iff II(A n B) > II(A n Be) 
iff N(A =?B) > N(A =? W), where =?denotes ma­
terial implication. It expresses that B is somewhat 
certain in context A iff An B is strictly more plausible 
than A n Be. A similar relation holds for guaranteed 
possibility: �(B I A) > 0 iff �(An B) > �(An Be) 
iff 'V(A =?B) > 'V(A =? Be). 
This points out the fact that the definition of condi­
tioning enforces the following normalization condition: 
min(�(B I A), �(Be I A))= 0. 
This expresses that everything (i.e. B and Be) cannot 
be guaranteed as being simultaneously possible, and 
the fact that B is guaranteed as being possible in con­
text A means that we have more guarantees in favor 
of B than in favor of Be. 
Thus one can write N(B I A) > 0 and �(B I A) > 0 
iff (�, II)( An B) > (�,II)( An Be) 
using the second partial ordering introduced in Section 
2. 
5 Strict comparative possibility bases 
A strict comparative possibility base P is a set of con­
straints of the form "in context a, b is more possible 
than �b" i.e. in terms of models, II( A n B) > II(A n 
Be), denoted by a -t b. It means that b is true in all 
best models of a. This can either express a general rule 
having exceptions, or the conditional preference of an 
agent. It encompasses the general case of constraints of 
the form II(A) > II(B). Indeed II(A) > II(B) is triv­
ially equivalent to II(A n Be) > II(B) and corresponds 
to the rule a V b -t �b since A n Be = (A U B) n Be. 
In a qualitative setting, a possibility distribution 
71' can be represented by its well-ordered partition 
WOP(11') = E1 U · · · UEn such that: E1 U · · · UEn = U, 
E;nEj = 0, and Vu, u', 11'(u) > 11'(u') iff u E E;, u' E Ej 
and i <j. 
Each strict comparative possibility base P induces 
a unique upper qualitative possibility distribution 
WOP(11'p) obtained by considering the least specific 
solution satisfying: 
for all ak -+ bk of P. 
In [4], an algorithm has been provided to compute 
WOP(11'p )= E1 U · · · UEn . Here we only recall its basic 
principle, which consists in putting each interpretation 
in the lowest possible rank (or highest possibility de­
gree) without violating constraints (12). The only case 
where we cannot put u in some partition E;, is when u 
is in the right part of some constraint (where there is a 
rule ak -+ bk such that u f= ak 1\ �h ) , and none of the 
interpretations of the left part of this constraint (i.e., 
u f= ak 1\bk) is already classified in some Ej with j < i. 
Therefore WOP(11'p) is computed as follows: for each 
step i, we put in E; all interpretations which are not 
in the right part of any constraint, then we remove all 
rules ak -t bk such that there exists at least u in E; 
such that u f= ak II bk. 
There exists a converse transformation from 71' to P, 
see [2]. 
Similarly, a set of �-based comparative constraints 
�(Ak n Bk) > �(Ak n B;;) defines a lower qualita­
tive possibility distribution by applying the maximal 
specificity principle. 
Let G = { ak ,._... bk : k = 1, · · · , n} be a set of rules. 
Let us denote by C= {�(Ak n Bk) > �(Ak n Bk) : 
ak ,._... bk E G} the set of �-based comparative con­
straints induced by G. Algorithm 1 provides the most 
specific qualitative distribution satisfying G, denoted 
by WOP(11'a). 
The idea of the algorithm consists in assigning to each 
interpretation the lowest possibility degree. At each 
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Algorithm 1: 
Data: G 
Result: WOP(rr) = E1 U · · · U En 
begin 
i � 0; 
while (U # 0) do 
i � i + 1; 
S; = {u : �Ll(Ak n Bk) > Ll(Ak n BZ) s.t. 
uEAknBk}; 
if S; = 0 then 
L G is inconsistent 
- Remove from U elements of S;; 
- Remove from C constraints such that 
S;n(AknB%) /;0 
return E1, · · ·,  E; s.t. Vj::; i ,  Ej = Si-j+l 
end 
step i, we put in S; the interpretations which are not 
in left part of any Ll-based constraint Ll(Ak n Bk) > 
Ll ( Ak n B%) (otherwise such a constraint will be falsi­
fied). For instance, the least plausible interpretations 
are those which do not verify any Ll-rule (namely, are 
not in any Ak n Bk)· 
Example 1 Let us consider an example where G = 
{p"-' q, p"-' ..,r,q"" r}, and p, q, r  are three proposi­
tional symbols. Let U = { w0 = pqr, w1 = pq..,r, w2 = 
p..,qr, wa = p..,q..,r, w4 = -,pqr, ws = ..,pq..,r, w6 
..,p..,qr,wr = ..,p..,q..,r}. 
Let us apply our previous algorithm. We have: 
C= Ll({wa ,wl}) > Ll({w2 ,w3}), Ll({wl,wa}) > 
Ll({wa ,w2}), Ll({wa ,w4}) > Ll({w!, ws})}. 
The use of maximal specificity principle leads to first 
put W6, W7, w2 and w5 in the lowest rank since they are 
not constrained, namely from our algorithm, we have: 
S1 = {w6,W7,W2,W5} · 
Once S1 is settled, all the constraints in C are satisfied, 
hence s2 contains the remaining interpretations. 
Hence, the partition associated to G is: 
E1 = {wo,w1,ws,w4} and E2 = {w2,ws,w6,w7} . 
A syntactic counterpart of the above algorithm where 
G would be directly encoded in terms of Ll-based for­
mulas, can be provided by taking advantages of trans­
formations between the different representations of a 
possibility distribution [2]. Its computational com­
plexity is not more costly than the one used to trans­
form a strict comparative possibility base into a pos­
sibilistic logic base [4]. 
6 Possibilistic networks 
Another compact representation of a possibility distri­
bution is graphical and is based on conditioning. Sym-
bolic knowledge is represented by DAGs, where nodes 
represent variables (in this paper, we assume that they 
are binary), and edges express influence links between 
variables. When there exists a link from X to Y, X 
is said to be a parent of Y. The set of parents of a 
given node X is denoted by Par(X). By the capital 
letter X we denote a variable which represents either 
the symbol x or its negation. An interpretation in this 
section will be simply denoted by X1 · · ·Xn. Uncer­
tainty is expressed at each node by a pair of lower and 
upper possibility distributions as follows: 
- For root nodes X; we provide the prior pos­
sibility degrees and guaranteed possibility degrees 
(Ll(X;), II(X;)) of x; and of its negation ..,x;. These 
prior should satisfy the normalization condition: 
max(IT(x;), II(..,x;)) = 1. The normalization condi­
tion min(Ll(x;), Ll(-,x;)) = 0 is assumed for guaran­
teed possibility degrees. 
- For other nodes Xj, we provide (Ll(X; I 
Par(X;)), IT(X; I Par(X;))) i.e. the conditional possi­
bility degrees and guaranteed possibility degrees of xi 
and of its negation ..,x j given any complete instantia­
tion of each variable of parents of Xj, UPar(X;). The 
conditional possibilities should also satisfy the normal­
ization conditions: 
max(IT(xj I UPar(X;)) ,II(-,xj I UPar(X;J) )  = 1. 
min(Ll(Xj I UPar(X1j) ,Ll(-,xj I UPar(X;J) )  = 0. 
The local possibilities (Ll(X;), II(X;)) (resp. (Ll(X; I 
Par(X;)), II(X; I Par(X;)) should satisfy the coher­
ence conditions: 
Ll(X;) ::; II(X;) 
(resp. Ll(X; I Par(X;))::; II(X; I Par(X;))). 
A first approach to defining a pair of joint distributions 
associated with a bipolar possibilistic graph is to apply 
the following rules: 
rr*(u) = min{IT(x I UPar(XJ): u f= x and u F UPar(XJ}, 
(13) 
rr.(u) = max{Ll(x I UPar(XJ) : u f= x and u f= UPar(X)}. 
(14) 
Example 2 Let us consider the following graph. 
v 
Figure 1: 
We have: (Ll(xl) = 0, II( xi) = .5), 
(Ll(x2) = O,II(x2) = 1), (Ll(-,x!) = .45,Il(-,x!) = 1), 
(Ll(..,x2) = .4, II(-,x2) == . 5) .  
Table 1 gives the conditional possibilities (Ll(Xs I 
X1X2),II(Xsl X1X2)). 
Table 2 shows the possibility distributions rr* and 1!" • 
associated with the graph. 
-; 
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XJX2 Xt•X2 -,X1X2 •Xt•X2 
xa ( .4, 1) (0, 1) (0, .5) ( .4, .8) 
-,X3 (0, .6) (.3, 1) ( .2, 1) (0, 1) 
Table 1: 
u 11". ( u) 7r.(u) 
--,Xt1X21X3 .5 .45 
•Xt...,X2X3 .5  .45 
•XtX2..,X3 1 .45 
-,X1X2X3 .5  .45 
Xt•X2'X3 .5 .4 
X1-,X2X3 .5  .4 
XJX2-,X3 .5  0 
X1X2X3 .5 .4 
Table 2: 
It is easy to check that 'v'u, 1r.(u)::::; 1r*(u). 
However, the coherence property is not a! ways guar­
anteed. Indeed, consider a bipolar possibilistic graph 
composed of two distinct nodes X and Y, such that: 
(�(x), II(x)) = (.3, .3) ,  (�(y), II(y)) = (.5, .6) 
(�(-,x), II(-,x)) = (0, 1) , (�(-,y), II(-,y)) = (0, 1) . 
We have 1r*(xy) = .3 while 1r.(xy) = .5. 
One way to guarantee that 1r. ::::; 7r* is to replace (14) 
by: 
the attribute when the cause takes place. Possibil­
ity distributions on a power set are heavy to handle 
and can be then approximated by a consistent pair of 
distributions on the domain we start with [7]. In prac­
tice, this means that a lower distribution describes the 
set of values which are possible effects more or less 
certainly, i.e. which are guaranteed as being possible 
effects, while the upper distribution restricts the val­
ues which are not impossible to some extent as being 
possible effects . 
Let 1r�. and 1r�• be the lower and upper distributions 
representing what is known of the effects of c on at­
tribute i. Given an observation of the value of at­
tribute i, which may be pervaded with imprecision 
and uncertainty, represented by a fuzzy set 0;, two 
indices can be computed for rank-ordering the causes 
according to their likelihood of presence. Namely, the 
consistency index of c with the observation defined by 
cons(O; , 1r�*) = supumin(O;(u), 1r�*(u)) ( 15) 
evaluates to what extent there exists a value compat­
ible with the observation which is not impossible for i 
when c takes place. 
Another index of relevance of c w.r.t. the observation 
can be defined as 
rel(O;, 1r�.) = infuO;(u) => 1r�.(u) (16) 
1r.(u) = min(min{II(x I UPar(X)): u F x and u F UPar(X)}, where=> denotes an implication function. This es-
_
max{�(x I UPar(�!): u F x and u � u-':•r(�J}). timates to what extent all the possible values of i Th1s expresses a revJsJon of the lower d1stnbutwn by t"bl "th th b t" th 1 . . . . · compa 1 e WI e o serva JOn are among e va -means of the upper d1stnbutwns m order to restore h" h t d t b "bl a t h . ues w 1c are guaran ee o e poss1 e euec s w en consistency. 
· Wh 0 · d" b f h 
7 Diagnosis 
Diagnosis knowledge can be described by means of re­
lations between causes and effects [14]. The effects of a 
cause c usually pertain to several attributes describing 
the system under consideration. On a given attribute, 
the possible effects of c are usually represented by a 
subset of possible values rather than a single value. 
For instance, we may have the rule "if you have a flu, 
your fever is in the interval [38.5, 40]°C". If we assume 
that our information is complete on the possible effects 
of a flu on the fever, it means that both i) any fever 
outside [38.5, 40]°C is impossible, and ii) any fever in 
[38.5, 40]°C is feasible, if you have a flu. 
c IS present. en i 1s an or mary su set o t e 
domain of attribute i, we can easily recognize that 
cons(O; , 1r�*) is nothing IIe(O;) = SUPue0;1r�*(u) while 
rel(O;, 1r�.) is nothing but �e(O;) = infueo;1r�.(u). 
Thus, when observation is precise, (15) expresses that 
0; is among the effects of c which are not impossible, 
while (16) indicates if 0; is among the guaranteed pos­
sible effects of c. (15) and (16) extend lie and �e to 
fuzzy sets. It can be shown that using Giidel implica­
tion in ( 16), namely 
x=>y=1�x:Symdx=>y=y�x>y. 
preserves the equivalence �(A) � a {::} 1r.(u) > 
min(A(u), a) for fuzzy sets A. 
Thus, clearly the relevance index is such that �e( 0;) ::S 
lie ( 0;), and thus refines the first one. 
Besides, from (11), we can write the Bayesian-like 
equation 
Suppose our knowledge about possible effects is un- Mm((C.,TI)(A I B),(C.,TI)(B)) = Mm((C.,TI)(B I A),(C.,TI)(A)). 
certain rather than complete. Then, we have to use a In case of empty prior (�, II)( B) = (0, 1), and using a 
distribution on the power set of the attribute domain. postulate of "observation relevance" [9] stating that 
In the possibilistic framework this distribution will en- mM((�, II)( A I B), (�, II)( A I Be))= (0, 1) , 
code that some subsets are more plausible than others it can be shown that (�, II)(B I A) behaves like 
for describing the exact subset of possible values for (�, II)( A I B). This provides a justification for using 
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(�c, llc)(O;) for estimating the plausibility of having 
cause c given 0;. 
8 Conclusion 
This paper has presented and advocated a twofold 
framework for representing uncertainty qualitatively. 
This can be useful for knowledge representation as well 
as preference representation. The bipolarity enables us 
to distinguish between what is possible or satisfactory 
for sure from what is just not impossible, or not unde­
sirable. 
It has been recently shown that bipolar possibilistic 
logic provides a natural framework for representing 
positive and negative desires [3]. Indeed, negative 
desires which refer to what is more or less rejected 
by an agent, correspond to constraints of the form 
TI(Rk) ::; Pk. They express that the models of Rk are 
considered as rather impossible. Positive desires are 
represented by constraints of the form �(Dj) 2': Jj, 
which expresses that any model of dj is satisfactory at 
least at level Jj. This representation framework has 
been applied in [3] for fusing the positive and nega­
tive preferences of different agents. Even if the prefer­
ences of each agent t are consistent in the sense that 
Vu, 1r� ::; 1r1*, it may occur, that the result of the fu­
sion of the lower distributions is no longer consistent 
with the result of the fusion of the upper distributions, 
indeed the same aggregation operator is not used for 
fusing the positive preferences represented by 1r� on 
the one hand, and the non-rejection-based preferences 
encoded by 1r1* on the other hand. Then a revision 
step should take place for enforcing the consistency. 
Besides, a possibility distribution can be represented 
equivalently in various compact frameworks: as a pos­
sibilistic logic base, as a possibilistic graph, or as strict 
comparative possibility constraints. This has been ex­
tended to the bipolar setting, by first defining the idea 
of conditioning (underlying the two last compact rep­
resentation frameworks listed above) for guaranteed 
possibility measures. Algorithms exist for going di­
rectly from one compact representation to another [21. 
They can be adapted to the bipolar framework. Ef­
ficient algorithms recently developed for uncertainty 
propagation in possibilistic graphs [1] could be ex­
tended to bipolar possi bilistic graphs as well. 
Lastly, the bilattice structure [11] of the bipolar frame­
work is worth investigating and may be of interest, 
especially in the view of developin� possibilistic logic 
programming, following Fitting [10j's approach. 
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